

* ~~SECRET~~ *

1

U.S. ARMY CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

+ + + + +

INTERVIEW

OF .

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RECONCILIATION CELL

MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ

+ + + + +

JANUARY 30, 2008

BAGHDAD, IRAQ

This transcript was produced from tapes
provided by the U.S. Army Center of Military History.

* ~~SECRET~~ *

~~* S E C R E T *~~

2

P R O C E E D I N G S

1
2 [b 6] This is [b(6)] the 3
3 Corps Writing Historian and Multinational Corps
4 Historian from the Center of Military History. Today
5 is 30 January 2008, and I am at the al Faw Palace, the
6 Headquarters of the Multinational Corps outside of
7 Baghdad, Iraq.

8 [b(3), b(6)] could you please state your
9 full name and the position you now fill in the Joint
10 Fires Cell?

11 [b(3), b(6)] Yes. [b 3 b(6)]
12 [b(3), b(6)] and I am the Chief of
13 Targeting and the Deputy for MNCI Reconciliation Cell.

14 [b(6)] Did I get that correct? You
15 are in the Joint Fires Cell?

16 [b 3 b 6] Yes, we are in the
17 Joint Fires Cell, but the Reconciliation Cell is
18 subordinated to the Corps overall and has a line
19 directly to General McDonald. It is in the JFC, but
20 since it was added in the middle of our deployment, it
21 actually isn't part of the JFC other than its
22 allegiance to General McDonald as our first General

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* SECRET *~~

1 Officer supervisor.

2 (b)(6)

So you --

3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

It's actually the MNCI

4 Reconciliation Cell versus the MNCI Joint Fire Cell
5 Reconciliation Cell.

6 (b)(6)

7 Right, but you report directly
to General McDonald on reconciliation?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Yes.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9 (Phonetic) and myself is direct to General McDonald
10 and then to General O.

11 (b)(6)

And I understand you are the

12 Deputy.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

13 may or may not return to this
position. Is that correct?

14 (b)(3), (b)(6)

15 We plan on him coming
back in the early part of February, and then with the
16 change in the Corps, the make-up and composition of
17 how they decide to organize to do the function of
18 reconciliation is still being worked at this time.

19 (b)(6)

All right. Okay.

20 (b)(3), (b)(6)

21 We chose to do a cell
only because we had to stand it up very quickly and

then functions into one

~~* SECRET *~~

4

1 group of people instead of spreading it out across the
2 staff. 18th is looking at possibly operationalizing,
3 since it has gotten so big, and putting those things
4 in FUOPS and embed it across the staff.

5 (b)(6) I see. Okay. Can you
6 describe what the Rec. Cell, Reconciliation Cell, is
7 supposed to do at your level?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) The (Inaudible)
9 Reconciliation Cell mission and intent has not changed
10 much since we stood it up in June. How we are
11 actually executing that intent has changed
12 dramatically.

13 With this entire effort that has grown so
14 rapidly since the spring of '07 time frame, we had to
15 constantly adapt and change to the environment in
16 Iraq, so that we are doing the appropriate tasks and
17 guidance in support of General Odierno's intent to
18 ensure that the divisions and the MEF are conforming
19 with that general guidance and accomplishing the goals
20 as they continue to evolve.

21 This reconciliation effort is not only a

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 political line of operation and, therefore, there is
2 many more nuances that are outside the Corps' control
3 that we have to be a stakeholder in and be flexible to
4 adapt to those changing conditions in the environment.

5 (b)(6) How would you describe General
6 McDonald's, your boss's intent for reconciliation?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) General McDonald has
8 a -- First and foremost, he is the executor of General
9 Odierno's guidance and intent, and executes what the
10 Corps Commander decides for us to do, that he does in
11 conjunction with Force.

12 Then he is also the primary General
13 Officer interface with the IFCNR or the Iraqi Formal
14 Council for National Reconciliation that Prime
15 Minister Maliki has designated as the conduit for
16 reconciliation activities for the government of Iraq.

17 General McDonald -- His intent is to
18 continually work with that organization and with the
19 Force FSEC, the Force Strategic Engagement Cell, to
20 shape those two entities that are in the international
21 zone so that our interests and General Odierno's
22 interests are best represented.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

6

1 This is not like a military operation: We
2 cut an order and, therefore, it is. There is much
3 negotiation, compromise and continued organizational
4 effort to get the things done the way that we think is
5 in our best interest and in the best interest of the
6 Iraqi people.

7 (b)(6): All right. I am going to drop
8 back a little bit on the organization that you are in,
9 the Joint Fires Cell.

10 Could you describe the change, the name
11 change that was undertaken of your cell back in
12 September, I believe it was.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. Yes, sir. We
14 changed both General McDonald's title and the title of
15 the cell based on a continuing evolution of how the
16 Corps visualized itself in terms of the processes,
17 procedures and organizational construct we used as the
18 operational headquarters in Iraq.

19 In previous rotations and even in the
20 beginning of our rotation, the effects based approach
21 to operations was looked at as at least a methodology
22 for critical thinking and problem analysis that the

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

7

1 staff did as a whole. That is why we are the Joint
2 Fires and Effects Cell, and General McDonald was the
3 Effects Coordinator.

4 That turned out to be problematic on a
5 number of levels, both at the individual and
6 organizational level. As we matured our processes and
7 General Odierno became more experienced here in Iraq
8 as the months went by, we evolved into a more
9 traditional construct of full spectrum operations that
10 fully take into account the Commander's intent for
11 achieving certain types of objectives on the ground
12 and certain conditions in the battle space without
13 using the problematic effects word that tends to hang
14 up a lot of people, both in planning, executing and
15 assessing operations.

16 (b)(6) And that word is?

17 (b)(3), (b)(6) Effects.

18 (b)(6) Effects. Okay.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Effects is the

20 problematic term. So in September right around the
21 time we went to Fort Bragg, General McDonald decided
22 that he would become the Deputy Commanding General of

~~* S E C R E T *~~

* S E C R E T *

8

1 Fires, and we would take out the E of the Joint Fires
2 and Effects Cell and become just the Joint Fire Cell.

3 Did that really change what we were doing?
4 Not really, but it changed the way that critical
5 thinking was done and how missions were coordinated
6 across the staff.

7 (b)(6) Do you know how 18th Airborne
8 Corps is configured, what they are going to call
9 themselves, your counterparts?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. 18th -- The
11 only challenge that we faced here, we are the last
12 legacy corps by MTO (Phonetic) to come into theater.
13 18th Airborne Corps has already transformed to a
14 modular design, and obviously, how the staff organized
15 is ultimately the Commander's decision, and here when
16 a corps comes to MNCI, you are fitting into a larger
17 JTF structure, but they are going to have a Fire
18 Support Cell that is subordinate to the C-3 and will
19 only do the traditional lethal fires and air support
20 and EW coordination that a fire support cell does at
21 the lower tactical echelons.

22 They will not have the equivalent of

* ~~S E C R E T~~ *

~~* S E C R E T *~~

9

1 General McDonald that will have IO and other pieces.
2 Those coordinations will be under the larger C-3
3 umbrella, under DCG Fairder (Phonetic) who is their
4 Deputy Commanding General of Operations. So a
5 slightly different approach to accomplishing the same
6 functions.

7 (b)(6) I see. I also want to clarify
8 one thing. The reconciliation is really Reconciliation
9 and Engagement Cell. Is that correct?

10 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. It is
11 Reconciliation and Engagement Cell. However, due to
12 the amount of operational requirements that the CLCs,
13 the Concerned Local Citizens, have become, the cell is
14 consumed with reconciliation activities vice
15 reconciliation and engagement planning.

16 We do very limited engagement planning.
17 Operations inside the REC are then coordinating
18 physical link-up of certain individuals across various
19 levels of headquarters to execute the engagement.

20 We do not do the engagement planning at
21 the level like the FSEC does, because we have a much
22 larger operational burden managing the 8,000 CLCs in

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* SECRET *~~

10

1 accordance with the divisions.

2 (b)(6) Right. I'd like to take you
3 back in time to the April-May time frame and have you
4 discuss about the term reconciliation and how that
5 term became so important to the Corps.

6 What caused it to do that?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, I will say it
8 from my perspective, and this is now probably the
9 Corps' perspective. This is just my perspective as
10 the lead action officer for this activity for the
11 Corps.

12 What happened is with the Awakening
13 movement in Anbar that really started in the summer of
14 '06-fall '06 time frame in a very heavily Sunni
15 homogeneous area with the Marines, traditional
16 reconciliation activities were starting. However,
17 when that migrated closer into Baghdad and into the
18 Belts of Baghdad that we saw with Abu Ghraib and Abu
19 Zahm (Phonetic) and such, it really wasn't
20 reconciliation.

21 It really was more accommodation, because
22 we as a third party between the Iraqi citizenry and

~~* SECRET *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

11

1 government of Iraq are heavily involved in what they
2 do. We were already down the road of reconciliation
3 having a meaning that had changed for how things were
4 happening here in theater. That had gained traction
5 both in military lexicon as well as in the media.

6 So we were stuck with reconciliation being
7 the label put on this larger popular movement that was
8 starting, and we actually did discuss changing the
9 term of what we were doing.

10 General O. never really made a decision to
11 change it. We weren't happy with reconciliation,
12 because it wasn't what we were doing, but as I said,
13 the ball was already in the court and in play. So we
14 decided to continue it, and we also were hoping that,
15 when you look at reconciliation at the larger level,
16 we were hoping that it would -- this would be very
17 temporary, and we would actually get into true
18 reconciliation between GOI and its people in a more
19 rapid fashion than we've been able to thus far.

20 (b)(6) All right. You know, I was
21 here in June, and of course, this is our second
22 interview with you. I did one with you in June. But

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

12

1 in June it seemed like the CG especially, but there
2 was a lot of talk at the Corps staff and in the BUAs,
3 the briefings, about reconciliation.

4 Then the Frago on reconciliation came out,
5 I think, at the beginning of June, the 4 Frago. What
6 I'm trying to get at is why you think it burst on the
7 scene, because it almost seems like, you know, when I
8 was here in March, I don't even recall hearing that
9 term used, and I come back two months later, and
10 everybody is talking about it.

11 So in my view, it looked like it burst on
12 the scene, and so why is that? Why did it happen so
13 suddenly? It seemed to.

14 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes, sir. Well, first
15 and foremost, and I cannot stress this enough, and if
16 you had [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) (Phonetic) or one of the Intel
17 guys in here, he would tell you the same thing, is we
18 were very fortunate that General Petraeus and General
19 O. put the puzzle together and saw this wave that was
20 already happening with the local Iraqi citizenry, in
21 many ways almost across the country, and I call it
22 like you catch the big wave, and we were just lucky.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

13

1 We jumped on the surfboard at the right time, and we
2 rode the wave, and we capped it right away.

3 We were lucky that we did, because it was
4 ready to burst. And as soon as we found a vehicle to
5 bring these people in from the cold -- We were hoping
6 it would not be a Coalition vehicle, i.e., the
7 critical infrastructure security contracts and our
8 allegiance with them through the rewards program.

9 We were hoping the GOI under a traditional
10 DVR would do that. But that was not happening. That
11 was stalled and dying, and General O. and General
12 Petraeus saw we had a window of opportunity here. It
13 was high risk, but at that point, you have to remember
14 what the conditions were in the spring time frame, and
15 our casualty rate, our political conditions back home
16 in the States and the general outlook of where we were
17 at here to get the surge to pay off, we had to roll
18 with it and take a gamble.

19 Luckily, we've got commanders like those
20 two that are willing to make those hard calls and find
21 -- force the staff to find a method to get it done,
22 which we did, and then everything just took off from

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

14

1 there.

2 We ended up putting the cap in place in
3 December due to political friction at that point
4 between Force in the greater aggregate and Prime
5 Minister Maliki, but that has since become less of a
6 critical boundary with the PM and more of a
7 containment on our own end, just because this was
8 getting so large, it was becoming unwieldy.

9 We probably -- If we did not cap, we
10 probably could have -- I don't know; this is
11 speculation, but probably in the hundreds of thousands
12 of individuals come forward, because this has truly
13 become a local grassroots political movement, as well
14 as a security movement; because the Iraqi people are
15 tired of us, tired of an ineffective GOI, tired of AQI,
16 tired of JAM special groups, and really want to get on
17 with their lives, return to normalcy, have a
18 functioning economy, schools that work, essential
19 services that work, and get on with everyday lives
20 like any other human beings do in the world.

21 (b)(6) Now one of the key vehicles
22 that made that work, I guess, beginning in June was

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

15

1 the CERP program. Right? The Commander's Program to
2 be able to, on the ground at the grassroots level, to
3 recruit and to pay on a salary basis for a period of
4 90 days, every 90 days a group of Concerned Local
5 Citizens. Is that right?

6 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Sir,
7 initially we attempted to get the government of Iraq
8 to buy off on what we were terming police support
9 units, which are police auxiliaries that would be paid
10 less than an IP but would be local security
11 augmentation to the IP forces; because as part of the
12 surge, as part of securing the population, which is
13 our number one objective, you've got to live with the
14 population in order to secure it.

15 That takes a lot of manpower, and even
16 with 20 brigades, we still had to figure out how to be
17 bigger than we are, and the way to do that was to
18 bring these people in that already wanted to
19 participate but had nowhere to go, and bring them into
20 the local security structure in their neighborhoods,
21 because they didn't want to lose the neighborhoods.
22 They want to secure their homes and their families and

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

16

1 their businesses and their schools, like anybody else
2 would.

3 We tried and tried to get the PSUs to get
4 adopted by GOI, couldn't get the traction --

5 (b)(6): PSU?

6 (b)(3), (b)(6): PSUs, Police Support
7 Unit. We tried that concept for about -- I would say
8 about 30 days we worked that hard, and then we said,
9 okay, this is not going to work; we have to find some
10 other means.

11 Some very smart guys here in the Rec., our
12 lawyers and our C-8 resource managers found a way that
13 we could get them into a CERP security contract,
14 called a critical (Inaudible) security contract, where
15 they are guarding their neighborhoods on a CERP
16 contract from us to perform local security activities
17 of that infrastructure.

18 That allowed them to function on the
19 ground, have ties with local ISF through the IA and
20 the IP and with us, and increase our security
21 footprint at the local level, which is where it
22 matters.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

17

1 That vehicle was able to propel our
2 security gains, kind of like a nitrous oxide boost, if
3 you will, to what the growth in the ISF and the growth
4 of our 20 brigades allowed us to do. So it was kind
5 of like a supercharge to the surge.

6 It is not solely responsible for the
7 success, but it is a key ingredient to the cocktail
8 that we brewed here in the summer of '07.

9 (b)(6) Now CERP is C-E-R-P, and
10 that's the Commander's --

11 (b)(3), (b)(6) Emergency Response
12 Program. And we use CERP dollars to do many, many
13 different things, and the reason why we defaulted to
14 CERP as a funding stream, even though we are working
15 now with different streams and different transition
16 plans we'll get into, but that is the only available
17 funding stream that military commanders have 100
18 percent access to and can do things rapidly here on
19 the ground.

20 CERP is ammunition. It is money that is
21 ammunition in this fight here in Iraq, and it is
22 absolutely critical to enabling the Commander's

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

18

1 flexibility to meet conditions on the ground, and we
2 keep having to use CERP to do a lot of different
3 things due to the inability of the U.S. government
4 funding programs to get money on the ground where and
5 when we need it, how we need it. That's why we end up
6 using CERP for so much.

7 [REDACTED] (b)(6) Do you think this idea of
8 paying the Concerned Local Citizens is a wise and
9 sound investment?

10 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) : Absolutely. General
11 Petraeus has done many briefings with the media and
12 back to DoD. They use a standard set of slides with
13 the SECDEF to show -- Some smart (Inaudible) have done
14 some analysis of the money spent in CERP contracts
15 versus lives saved and vehicle/equipment damage saved
16 over time.

17 It is a very small sum of money for the
18 amount of money and, most importantly, lives that we
19 are saving on the return end. There's many areas
20 where you can take vignettes, especially like in
21 Mahmudiyah where they had very high casualties in the
22 spring, and since that time they have had, I think,

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

19

1 three KIAs over the last six months.

2 So that is heavily tied to the amount of
3 CLCs they have in the area, because the people have
4 always known where the insurgents are. They are now
5 helping us find the insurgents, find the IEDs and are
6 stopping the activity before it can kill our soldiers
7 and the Iraqi Security Forces.

8 (b)(6) It also leads to -- I mean,
9 when you get these Concerned Local Citizen groups
10 together, you organize them, they are equipped. Now
11 we don't pay for their weapons, I understand.

12 (b)(3), (b)(6) No, we are not legally
13 allowed to arm or equip the CLCs. They are not a
14 paramilitary force. They are purely a local security
15 arm.

16 (b)(6) Sort of like a neighborhood
17 watch.

18 (b)(3), (b)(6) They are a
19 neighborhood watch, but neighborhood watch in this
20 part of the world means you got an AK-47, which
21 everybody does.

22 What we do when the units -- and this is

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

20

1 all done at the company, task force, brigade level --
2 negotiate with -- I keep talking to that thing instead
3 of talking to you.

4 (b)(6) That's fine.

5 (b)(3), (b)(6) They negotiate with
6 the sheikhs or with the citizen groups, and then as
7 part of the contract negotiation, the contractor,
8 whoever that may be, has to provide them with
9 uniforms, radios, life support, all those things, and
10 that's figured into the contract cost so that he can
11 provide that for --

12 (b)(6) As well as salaries, for
13 example?

14 b 3, b 6 As well as -- the
15 CLCs, right, which we have not put in a cap into
16 effect where they cannot be paid more than \$350 per
17 month, which is roughly equivalent to what an IP
18 private gets with their hazardous pay, because we
19 don't want to make it more lucrative than being in the
20 ISF, because we want to get them transitioned either
21 into the formal ISF structure, into another ministry's
22 security apparatus like MOO (Phonetic) or MOE or into

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

21

1 one of the employment programs like JTERP (Phonetic),
2 VOTEC, CSC or, you know, in the perfect world into the
3 private sector.

4 As the economic and governance gains
5 happen under this bubble of security that we have, you
6 know, the Iraqi version of Blockbusters and McDonalds
7 and everything else will start sprouting up, and these
8 guys will be able to just get jobs and be normal
9 private sector people. That's the goal in the long
10 run.

11 We are already seeing that happen out west
12 in Anbar.

13 (b)(6) Now the fact that these are
14 local, and the fact that the interaction takes place
15 between U.S. company leaders and battalion leaders
16 down at the grassroots level, also allows the benefit
17 of intelligence and getting to know who the local
18 people are.

19 So that can rebound to our benefit, like
20 you just pointed out, where the IEDs are buried, where
21 the caches are, and where the bad guys are. Is that
22 right?

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

22

1 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir. And if you
2 look at graphs that Force produces and we produce, the
3 amount of caches that have been found has gone up
4 exponentially over the last year. We are spending in
5 the neighborhood of 1100 percent more money this year
6 in the DoD rewards program than we did a year ago, and
7 the amount of tips received is also going up.

8 That is all a function of securing the
9 population, living with the population, knowing the
10 population, and being able to use those human sensors
11 to help us prosecute the fight.

12 [REDACTED] That's all good stuff.

13 [REDACTED] And I would have to
14 say that, when we deal with the CLCs and with the
15 local citizenry, the two programs in the Commander's
16 toolbox that we have built for them in our
17 reconciliation framework, two most used are the CIS
18 contracts, critical infrastructure contracts, and --

19 [REDACTED] Critical infrastructure
20 contracts?

21 [REDACTED]: Yes, sir, critical
22 infrastructure security contracts, CIS contracts, and

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

23

1 the DoD Rewards Program that we did major
2 reorganization to so that the Rewards Program is much
3 more viable and responsive to the needs of the
4 company, battalion and brigade commanders; because
5 this is truly a grassroots, bottom up fight, and they
6 have to be empowered.

7 Money is ammunition. They've got to be
8 able to access it. In the previous years, the Reward
9 Program was extremely cumbersome and was not useful --
10 as useful as it could be at the company, battalion and
11 brigade level.

12 We have upped the amount of money that the
13 brigade commanders are allowed to approve for rewards,
14 as well as, most importantly, got money down --
15 standing monies down to the company, battery, troop
16 level so that they can pay immediate tip money on
17 intelligence gained.

18 Three years ago, it would take two to four
19 weeks and sometimes longer to get tip money paid and,
20 obviously, you cannot reinforce -- people are risking
21 their lives to get us information. By telling them ,
22 oh, come back in two to four weeks, and maybe we will

~~* S E C R E T *~~

* S E C R E T *

24

1 have money for you.

2 Now it is an immediate pay as you go
3 system. The company commanders have money every day
4 down in the companies, which makes it 1,000 times more
5 effective.

6 (b)(6) Is the rewards program just
7 targeted for tips or is it also for caches?

8 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. It is
9 encompassing for caches, IEDs, intelligence, and all
10 manners of those things. We also use what we call
11 rewards in kind with some of the volunteer groups.

12 When they bring us intelligence, we may
13 reward them with cellphones, portable radios, other
14 types of rewards in kind that are equivalent to a
15 monetary reward but provide some functionality to even
16 increase their value to us and to the Iraqi government
17 even more.

18 So a very, very key piece by a lot of hard
19 bureaucratic work, because one of the most challenging
20 things with this whole reconciliation effort has been
21 not -- It isn't so much fighting the Iraqi insurgency
22 and dealing with the people.

* ~~S E C R E T~~ *

~~* S E C R E T *~~

25

1 It's fighting our own bureaucracy and
2 understanding between what is happening here on the
3 ground in Iraq and getting that up the chain through
4 Force, CENTCOM, OSD and into the U.S. government.

5 That is an ongoing daily battle. This has been
6 an educational piece that we do all the time. We are
7 on the road constantly explaining and educating and
8 making people aware of what is happening, so that
9 there is a more uniform understanding of what has
10 happened.

11 The CLCs are not a paramilitary group.
12 They are not Sunni armed militia that we are designing
13 to overthrow the Iraqi government. They are none of
14 those things. But all those perceptions have been out
15 there and have caused us problems in getting the
16 resources that we need to our first line combat
17 leaders on the ground who are dealing with the Iraqi
18 people every day.

19 (b)(6) And I wondered if you would
20 address the critical infrastructure security
21 contracts. Does that come under the CERP program?

22 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Yes. The CIS

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

26

1 contracts are funded under CERP in accordance with
2 CERP regulatory guidance.

3 (b)(6) Right. And can you give me an
4 example of what a CIS, critical infrastructure
5 security contract, would do?

6 (b)(3), (b)(6) Right. In any
7 mulhallah (Phonetic) and in the rural areas as well,
8 in areas where they have water pumping stations, sewer
9 pumping stations, power substations, critical bridges
10 or dams or those types of things that are important
11 infrastructure to keep their local economies going as
12 well as maintaining security in their areas against
13 targets that the insurgents have liked to damage in
14 the past, they secure those and fix site security.

15 So, basically, they are helping secure
16 local areas so that the ISF and Coalition forces can
17 conduct offensive operations and more aggressive
18 operations against AQI, JAM special groups, or other
19 forms of insurgency.

20 Again, it goes back to getting -- to
21 secure the population, you have to live with it, and
22 you have to be teamed with it. That is what we are

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

27

1 trying to get at. That also helps us get larger than
2 we are by bringing in these folks to help us control
3 the ground so that we can move combat forces to other
4 areas.

5 (b)(6) These CIS contracts also
6 benefit the Iraqi local population. Right?

7 (b)(3), (b)(6) : Right. Yes, sir.

8 Then, sir, that is an excellent point, and we are
9 working on now trying to figure out how we are going
10 to assess this.

11 General Odierno, through all his
12 battlefield circulation travels around the country
13 each day, brought it up about a month ago. We are
14 starting to realize now that the CLC monies have been
15 getting pumped into various areas over the last six
16 months or eight months, the accumulation of that
17 spending and investment in local areas has had second
18 and third order effects that we were not anticipating,
19 because now these groups are having money.

20 So, therefore, they are spending money in
21 their local neighborhoods that they don't want to
22 leave, which therefore, helps the businesses come back

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

28

1 sooner, which forces those businesses to hire guys and
2 go out and get distributors to bring in stuff.

3 So we are seeing a larger micro-economic
4 impact above and beyond the first order direct
5 spending of us paying a salary to the CLC. So it is
6 actually now a double-win, and we are trying to figure
7 out how we are going to measure and assess that
8 additional value added that we are getting from each
9 CERP dollar expended.

10 This is very helpful when you look at
11 areas, especially in MND-North and MND-Center out in
12 the more rural areas where the economic and
13 reconstruction dollars have not been as tightly massed
14 as they have been here in Baghdad.

15 So we are starting to get some additional
16 economic benefit without going down the economic road,
17 if you will, by using the CIS contracts.

18 (b)(6) Okay.

19 (b)(3), (b)(6) Can we stop? Be right

20 back.

21 (b)(6) Yes.

22 (Short Recess.)

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

29

1 [b](6) We are resuming now.

2 I wondered if you could please walk me
3 forward from the May time frame to the present and
4 identify from your position in the Corps what you
5 consider key points in the reconciliation -- in the
6 development of the reconciliation process?

7 [b](3), (b)(6) Okay. Well, there's
8 probably been three major points along the road here
9 that we have went through.

10 First and foremost was: In June General
11 Odierno and General Petraeus, rightfully seeing this
12 window of opportunity we had with the Iraqi people,
13 the Corps published Frago 107 to upward 07-01, which
14 was our reconciliation guidance to unit, at least the
15 original framework.

16 That was happening at the same time we had
17 a ongoing effort that had been brewing for several
18 months, which was [b] 6 (Phonetic) and the 4,000
19 or so Sunni (Inaudible) in Abu Ghurayb in the 1st
20 Cavalry Division sector, MND-B.

21 [b] 6 That's 25 Cav?

22 [b](3), (b)(6): 2-5 Cav. [b](3), (b)(6)

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

30

1 (b)(3), (b)(6) and 2-5 Cav in 1st Brigade, 1st
2 Cavalry Division sector in Abu Ghurayb.

3 That was the first major group that came
4 forward outside of the Anbar SAI piece that the West
5 was working since '06. That took a lot of time to
6 get through the political challenges with GOI and a
7 lot of negotiations by very senior Generals in
8 negotiation with GOI to get that done.

9 We finally got agreement. We got 2000 of
10 them into training. 1742 graduated and are now Abu
11 Ghurayb IPs.

12 Did that go perfectly? No, it didn't,
13 because even when they went into training, we still
14 had to provide them separate training areas and
15 separate stationing when they came out, because they
16 were in the IPs, but they weren't really in the IPs.

17 They were getting paid. They got blue
18 shirts, but there was still some sectarian issues and
19 other organizational strike issues that forced us to
20 do some different things to accommodate GOI's
21 acceptance of these folks into the IP.

22 That was really the precedent event that

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

31

1 started our larger movements of bringing the CLCs on
2 the CIS contracts and then simultaneously working to
3 transition those where we could into the ISF
4 structure.

5 In July, the Prime Minister directed the
6 IFCNR to stand up the Iraqi formal Committee for
7 National Reconciliation led by (b)(6) (Phonetic)
8 and (b)(6) (Phonetic), and that organization was
9 directed by the PM to handle all matters national
10 reconciliation for him and report directly to him.

11 That became the focal point of many of the
12 Coalition engagements on larger reconciliation issues,
13 but as the CLC program got larger and larger and we
14 realized that the reintegration piece and transition
15 piece was going to get large, the IFCNR became
16 primarily focused on CLC management and those kinds of
17 things.

18 That was probably step number two, and
19 then from the summer into December things were
20 growing, growing, growing, and we had just explosive
21 growth.

22 (b)(6): Can you talk a little bit

~~* S E C R E T *~~

* S E C R E T *

32

1 about the growth --

2 (b)(3), (b)(6): Right. As of June 1st
3 -- June 1st we had 2000 or so people, and by January
4 1st we were up to 80,000.

5 (b)(6) How many were we by September?

6 (b)(3), (b)(6): I would say around
7 35,000. I can get a better number on that. September
8 '09 is the first -- I should say the 9th of September
9 '07 is the first decent snapshot that we were able to
10 get from units, because we had such great growth, it
11 took a while to get the (Inaudible) controls in place
12 and get our arms around exactly how many we had.

13 (b)(6) I'm sorry. What was that date
14 again?

15 (b)(3), (b)(6): 9 September. That was
16 our first reporting cutoff.

17 (b)(6) First reporting. Oh.

18 (b)(3), (b)(6) When we had good,
19 clean numbers that were --

20 (b)(6): And it was about 35,000?

21 (b)(3), (b)(6): I will go back and get
22 you the exact number, sir, but it was probably around

* ~~S E C R E T~~ *

~~* S E C R E T *~~

33

1 that. We had attempted to get various reporting as we
2 were going, but at that point in the summer, from June
3 to September, the focus was on growing contacts, and
4 we were doing that in conjunction with ourselves with
5 the local units, with the ORA (Phonetic) playing a
6 heavy piece, CJSOTF.

7 A lot of people were involved in getting
8 contacts linked up with our local units in areas,
9 unlike (b)(3), (b)(6) where they came basically
10 knocking on his door, and growing our contacts. Then
11 in about September time frame, CIS took off, and then
12 by January we were up to 80,000.

13 The third key point that I would submit is
14 the 2 December MCN-S meeting between General Odierno,
15 the Prime Minister and General Petraeus was a seminal
16 day in terms of agreements that we made with GOI and
17 O. decided to enforce for the Corps.

18 That is when we first had discussion of
19 the cap. Well, there had been discussions that we
20 were going to cap in November and in December, but we
21 had not decided yet how we were best going to do that
22 and how things were going to play out; because this is

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

34

1 not purely a military decision. Obviously, there's
2 heavy political decisions that have to be made,
3 depending on the current state of play with GOI.

4 So at the 2 December MCNS, General O. laid
5 out a very, very transparent briefing to the PM,
6 because up until that point we kept having to brief
7 over and over again to the IFCNR everything we were
8 doing, because they were accusing us of not being
9 transparent, not laying our where the CLCs were.

10 There was a lot of mistrust from GOI
11 against what we were doing, and we had a series of
12 brigade, then division, and then ultimately General O.
13 and General P. laid it out for the Prime Minister.

14 He agreed, at least verbally committed to
15 supporting the reconciliation movement and the CLC
16 movement, and we at that point as well agreed to
17 capping at 103,000 -- I should say at around 100,000.

18 [b 6] MCNS meeting -- what does that
19 stand for?

20 [b(3), b(6)]: It is the Ministerial
21 Committee for National Security.

22 [b(6)] All right.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 [b 3, b 6] That is the big
2 meeting each week that the very seniors have.

3 [b 6] Right. I've seen it
4 mentioned. I just wanted to capture that.

5 [b(3), b(6)] And so that was
6 probably the third seminal point, and now we are into
7 this phase of going hard on -- intensified
8 (Inaudible), and now we have been going very, very
9 hard in transition planning.

10 A couple of things on transition as this
11 gets cashiered, because there's a lot of
12 misperceptions out there that we keep fighting, both
13 through orders, in the press and to our units.

14 We are in no rush to transition the CLCs
15 to the government of Iraq. Our first priority, first
16 and foremost, is security of the local Iraqi
17 population, security of our soldiers, and security of
18 the ISF.

19 So local security will drive any decision
20 that the division and brigade commanders make, in
21 conjunction with the MNCI commander, whoever that may
22 be, going forward.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

* S E C R E T *

36

1 Security will drive our transition. There
2 is no timeline that says we have to turn over by June
3 of '09, by October '08. There is no hard marks on the
4 wall. We have goals for transition.

5 As the security environment, hopefully,
6 continues to improve, we will be able to transition
7 more of these CLCs into other types of employment and
8 not have to use them in security. But if the local
9 security situation demands their presence, we will
10 continue to either renew their contracts under our
11 control or at some point in the future, transition
12 them to MOI in a security contract role or find some
13 other modicum of doing that.

14 We will not transition them just for the
15 sake of transitioning to make some arbitrary timeline.
16 We will not make those mistakes with this transition
17 that have been made in some other transitions in the
18 past.

19 [REDACTED] (b)(6) The cap you talked about -- Is
20 that the cap in total numbers, so it is capped at
21 about 80,000?

22 [REDACTED] (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, no, sir. The

* ~~S E C R E T~~ *

~~* S E C R E T *~~

37

1 cap has morphed over time. Like I said, everything in
2 reconciliation is not cut and dry. It changes
3 depending on the current state of play in the battle
4 space, with militarily, politically as well.

5 So the cap started at 103,000, and that
6 was for total CLCs, and total CLCs, we mean
7 contracted, CIS personnel, plus active volunteers.
8 Our active volunteer number has become less and less
9 large of a factor, but initially we counted them into
10 the CLC numbers.

11 So it was your contract number, plus your
12 volunteer number gave you your CLC, which was your
13 cap.

14 Earlier this month, General Odierno
15 changed his guidance cap-wise, because we learned
16 more, understood more, and realized what we were
17 dealing with, and we changed the cap definition to
18 only being our contracted CLCs.

19 (b)(6): All right, and that is still
20 at about 103,000?

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) We just changed it
22 today, in fact, to 107,000. We allowed more for

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

38

1 Center because of the issues. Center has done a
2 tremendous job in expanding security, basically tying
3 from Mahmudiyah east across the river and into Wasit.
4 They have had a larger and larger requirement for
5 CLCs, just because they don't have the troop density
6 down there for ISF and Coalition.

7 That is our point on the transition piece.
8 We may end up having small pockets of contracts,
9 whether ourselves or, hopefully, under GOI control 18
10 or 24 months into the future, because there's some
11 places where there might not ever be ISF to be
12 envisioned to go in there, but we have to still
13 provide some sense of security until local conditions
14 continue to mature.

15 (b)(6) Right.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) So we may still have
17 a small number, albeit a small number, on contract
18 well down the road. We are not going to go to 100
19 percent transition just to make some arbitrary
20 timeline that we have drawn for ourselves. Conditions
21 on the ground will drive the train.

22 (b)(6) I went on your website and

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

39

1 reviewed the reconciliation page, and I went through
2 each division and tried to capture the numbers, MND --
3 each MND.

4 The MND-Baghdad and MND-Center have the
5 most CLCs.

6 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Absolutely.

7 (b)(6)

And they are in the

8 neighborhood of 30. I think Baghdad is about 30, and
9 MND-Center has the most, about 31 or 32, something
10 like that, when I looked at it yesterday.

11 I don't know how current those figures
12 are.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6)

Every week. They are
14 updated every week, and in some cases, depending on
15 the requests for information that come in, sometimes
16 we end up updating them more than we want to, which is
17 almost every day.

18 (b)(6)

I looked at Multinational
19 Division-North where the security situation is most
20 precarious, and I didn't see too many up there. I
21 forget the exact figure, but it was --

22 (b)(3), (b)(6)

It's in the low teens.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

40

1 [] (b)(6) Yes. It was significantly
2 lower by half than in Baghdad and in Center.

3 [] (b)(3), (b)(6) Correct.

4 [] (b)(6) I wondered why that was. If
5 the security problem is greatest up there, is it a
6 question of population density versus the wide open
7 expanses up there or is it a question of the problem
8 with the population, that they don't want to get into
9 these? What do you think it is?

10 [] (b)(3), (b)(6) Right. It's a multi
11 -- There's many different pieces to a very complex
12 problem up north. As you know, the North has never
13 been the center of attention that Baghdad has had. It
14 is extremely complex battle space.

15 As you mentioned, it is a very, very large
16 battle space. We have about half the number of
17 soldiers up north than we do here in Baghdad, half the
18 ISF.

19 What we have found is where we have forces
20 and where the ISF have forces, the CLCs are. It is
21 difficult to cultivate these folks away from our units
22 and away from the ISF. When you take that into

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 account, as well as the traditional AQI safe grounds
2 and Ninevah and --

3 [b 6] [b 3, b 6] and --

4 [b(3), b(6)] -- and [b 3, b 6], very
5 challenging. Then the whole Kurd piece coming out of
6 the KRG region and into the Mosul-Kirkuk problem set,
7 things become much more tenuous, and the traditional
8 CLC model does not work as cleanly as it does here.

9 North is working that and has been working
10 it for several months, but it has proved to be much
11 more difficult up north than it has been in Baghdad
12 and in Center, especially in Mosul.

13 Mosul has turned into being an extremely
14 complex piece that we are currently engaged in, and
15 probably will consume North for the rest of its
16 rotation here at least, as it has got many, many
17 competing demands facing it that sometimes we just
18 sight on here in Baghdad as we are so Baghdad focused.

19 We hope -- North has got plenty of cap
20 space. We have no shortage of money or resource, and
21 we hope that North will use these forces to augment
22 their security as best they can, given their local

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

42

1 conditions. But we will see how things play out.

2 Everywhere in Iraq is different. I call
3 it the patchwork of Iraq. What works in one brigade
4 sector doesn't work in another brigade sector, doesn't
5 work in the battalion nextdoor sector. So we have to
6 be cognizant of that, and it is not a cookie cutter
7 approach.

8 We've got a very useful slide that shows
9 the difference in the models between Anbar, Diyala,
10 into Wasit and those things, because the Awakening is
11 very different across the country.

12 b 6 And I also noticed that in
13 Anbar, of course, you have the Anbar Awakening first
14 and the Sunni tribal structure itself has played a
15 major role there, but the CLC numbers are very low
16 there.

17 Is that because they have already been
18 incorporated into the local IPs?

19 (b)(3), (b)(6): Yes, sir. Really,
20 from my perspective -- and I tend to explain it to
21 people -- is Anbar is a generation ahead of the rest
22 of Iraq. They caught onto the program about a year

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

43

1 ahead of everybody else.

2 In some ways -- The Marines have done
3 fantastic work, and not to cut down anything that the
4 MEF has done, because they have done some tremendous,
5 tremendous stuff in light of the fact that Anbar never
6 is -- they may never -- Baghdad always is the main
7 effort -- they have done a tremendous amount with the
8 little that they have had. However, the homogeneous
9 Sunni population and its lack of outside influences
10 are not as pronounced as in other areas of Iraq.

11 So if there was a great place for us to
12 start, it was in Anbar. SAI was able to stand up
13 quickly with Sheikh Sittar (Phonetic). The Marines
14 were able to get their arms around that. He had
15 instant -- not instant, but very rapid control over
16 the majority of the Anbari population.

17 They were sick and tired of AQI living in
18 their backyard for the last four years. So they moved
19 out well ahead of the rest of Iraq.

20 They never really had CLCs in the sense of
21 the program that we needed, that we have done in other
22 parts of the country, because they had no requirement

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

44

1 for it. They already had the local security provided
2 by SAI, the IPs, the ISF and the Marines.

3 So we helped West in reconciliation
4 effort, primarily with economics and governance
5 support, which is really what they need to get fully
6 reconciled from the regional to the national
7 government, which we hope to get in the rest of the
8 country this year as the rest of the country catch up.

9 So they really didn't have the CLC in a
10 traditional sense of CIS guards.

11 b 6 Can you briefly describe the
12 ongoing reconciliation efforts and MND-Center South
13 and MND-Southeast? I know it is a little bit beyond
14 -- outside the range, but I know there are some
15 reconciliation units there.

16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Yes. Again, this is
17 my perspective and not the Corps' perspective.

18 We have made at some level above us, I
19 guess national strategic level or somewhere above the
20 Corps or in conjunction with the Corps, decisions not
21 to pursue the Awakening, as the Iraqis call it -- the
22 reconciliation movement in the south. When the Iraqis

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 say the south, that means MND-Center South and
2 Southeast area.

3 That has been a political decision to
4 accommodate GOI and the PM's requests to our
5 leadership at whatever level. That -- In our opinion,
6 the narrow view of reconciliation is problematic,
7 because just like we saw in MND-Center's area, and we
8 know in Kadicea (Phonetic) and in Diwo (Phonetic), the
9 people are ready to come out.

10 They are not happy with their provincial
11 government. They are not happy with the ISF -- Well,
12 I shouldn't say that. They are moderately happy with
13 the Iraqi Army, not so much the IP. They don't like
14 the provincial government. They really don't like
15 having the Coalition there either, but they are ready
16 to come forward.

17 We could have had many, many thousands
18 down there, but we chose not to pursue that at this
19 time.

20 b 6 I see.

21 (b)(3), (b)(6) And that has, in some
22 ways, limited our abilities to be bigger than we are

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

46

1 down south, because we don't have the CLC mechanism to
2 help secure those areas and provide the accelerants.

3 So we will see how that plays out. If we
4 had 30 brigades, we probably wouldn't have done that.
5 I don't know that, but I'm saying I would assume that
6 we wouldn't.

7 We would like, obviously, to be able to
8 cut off the border of (b)(3), (b)(6), so it does not keep sending
9 EFPs into this country. So our inability to get
10 bigger down there has caused us some problems we are
11 working.

12 We are working to get every piece of
13 enabler and some other things. In fact, we are going
14 to meet today with 18th Airborne Corps. We, (b3, b6)
15 (b3, b6) (Phonetic), and our cell did some exploratory
16 work for General Odierno on how we would do stuff in
17 the South, given our limited resources and given the
18 challenges that we are now in politically down there,
19 because we realize that it's critical.

20 Everyone knows it's critical. It's just
21 how you get there and how you execute it. And that
22 has been a contentious point for us inside the

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 reconciliation cell, because in our dealings with the
2 divisions we are very, very sensitive to the south of
3 Iraq being really the long term issue for Iraq
4 stability in the near -- or I should say, in the mid-
5 to long term.

6 There is no doubt that the Iraqi people
7 have realized that AQI's ideology is bankrupt. They
8 will probably not let it resettle here. We will
9 commit and stay committed with a large amount of
10 counter-terrorism forces from now until forever
11 against AQI.

12 JAM special groups, JAM, Badr, OMUS
13 (Phonetic), all those pieces are much, much harder to
14 differentiate and much, much harder to separate from
15 the people. If we allow Shia extremism, extremism of
16 any kind -- Sunni, Shia, it don't matter; purple,
17 black, white, doesn't matter. We have got to stop
18 extremism from affecting the middle of the population
19 that just wants to go about life like you and I do in
20 suburban America.

21 That becomes the problem. When we don't
22 have forces down there, we take these provinces, and

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

48

1 we don't have ISF, we don't have CLCs -- how we
2 actually are able to shape that environment is going
3 to be extremely complicated going forward.

4 Our concern going forward is that it may
5 be too late until we realize the unintended
6 consequences of decisions we made in 2007.

7 (b)(6): All right. That's actually
8 all the question I have, except for one last one.

9 This last question I have is to give you
10 an opportunity to cover something that we may not have
11 discussed that you think important to get on the
12 record.

13 (b)(3), (b)(6) Well, what I would
14 say: When it comes to reconciliation efforts is this
15 is nothing new. What we are doing dealing with the
16 local population has been done time immemorial, from
17 the time of the Romans into earlier Colonial times to
18 what we did in Vietnam and to where we are now. This
19 is nothing new.

20 The tools and how we actually did it may
21 be different, but conceptually it's the same thing,
22 and it goes back to the fundamental piece: Secure the

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

1 population. You got to limit the population. You got
2 to be teamed with it, and you have to have its
3 support.

4 If you don't have those three things
5 happening, you will not be successful prosecuting the
6 counterinsurgency fight, which leads to getting into
7 stability.

8 The problem that we have with
9 reconciliation that we've done here is we have a lack
10 of understanding and education inside the U.S.
11 military and inside the U.S. government in getting it
12 done rapidly in support of our guys at the tip of the
13 spear, at company, battery, troop level out on the
14 ground.

15 That is, if we take anything away from
16 this, is that we need to understand how to do this
17 right away, up front, monies, ammunition, and put this
18 into the fight.

19 We were already, in fact, starting this --
20 not at this scale, but we had plans in my last
21 rotation here in (Inaudible) to do this on a very
22 small scale up in west Rasheed in 2004.

~~* S E C R E T *~~

~~* S E C R E T *~~

50

1 So being able to do this earlier in the
2 fight as part of the overall campaign plan will help
3 us not get into extended, protracted issues that we
4 face now.

5 (b)(6) : All right. Thank you very
6 much, (b)(3), (b)(6)

7 This concludes the interview.

8 - - -

~~* S E C R E T *~~